3 is a specification language for information systems. The core of the eb 3 language consists of process algebraic specifications describing the behaviour of the entities in a system, and attribute function definitions describing the entity attributes. The verification of eb 3 specifications against temporal properties is of great interest to users of eb 3 . In this paper, we propose a translation from eb 3 to LOTOS NT (LNT for short), a value-passing concurrent language with classical process algebra features. Our translation ensures the one-to-one correspondence between states and transitions of the labelled transition systems corresponding to the eb 3 and LNT specifications. We automated this translation with the eb 3 2lnt tool, thus equipping the eb 3 method with the functional verification features available in the CADP toolbox.
Introduction
The eb 3 method [FSt03] is an event-based paradigm tailored for information systems (ISs). eb 3 has been used in the research projects selkis [MIL + 11] and eb 3 sec [JFG + 10], whose primary aim is the formal specification of ISs with security policies. In the eb 3 sec project, real banking industry case studies have been studied, describing interaction with brokers, customers and external financial systems. The selkis project deals with two case studies from the medical domain. The first one draws data records from medical imaging devices. The access to these records is done via web-based applications. The second one deals with availability and confidentiality issues for medical emergency units evolving in a great mountain range, like the Alps in that case.
A typical eb 3 specification defines entities, associations, and their respective attributes. The process algebraic nature of eb 3 enables the explicit definition of intra-entity constraints, making them easy for the IS designer to review and understand. Yet, its particular feature compared to classical process algebras, such as CSP [Hoa78] , lies in the use of attribute functions, a special kind of recursive functions evaluated on the system execution trace. Combined with guards, attribute functions facilitate the definition of complex inter-entity constraints involving the history of events. The use of attribute functions simplifies system understanding, enhances code modularity, and streamlines maintenance. However, given that ISs are complex systems involving data management and concurrency, a rigorous design process based on formal specification using eb 3 must be completed with effective formal verification features. We write x , y, x 1 , x 2 , . . . for variables and v , w , v 1 , v 2 , . . . for data expressions over user-defined domains, such as integers, Booleans and more complex domains that we do not give formally, for conciseness. Let Act be a set of actions written ρ, ρ 1 , ρ 2 , . . . and Lab be a set of labels written α, α 1 , α 2 , . . .. Each action ρ is either the internal action written λ, or a visible action of the form "α (v )", where α ∈ Lab. Hence, visible actions consist of labels and data vectors. The notion of eb 3 actions coincides with the notion of CSP internal actions [Hoa78] . We also use the overlined notation as a shorthand notation for lists, e.g., x denotes a list of variables x 1 , . . . , x n of arbitrary length. An eb 3 specification consists of a set of attribute function definitions A 1 , . . . , A n , and of a set of process definitions of the form "P (x ) E ", where P is a process name and E is a process expression.
Attribute functions Attribute function definitions are denoted by the symbol A in the grammar of Fig. 2 . We assume a set of labels Lab {α 1 , . . . , α q } (λ not included). Each α j has formal parameters x j . Attribute functions {f 1 , . . . , f n } are defined recursively on the current trace T representing the history of actions with the aid of functions last (T) which denotes the last action of the trace, and front (T) which denotes the trace without its last action. The symbol ⊥ represents the undefined value. In particular, both last (T) and front (T) match ⊥ when the trace is empty. The symbol (wildcard) matches all actions not matched by any of the preceding action patterns α 1 (x 1 ), . . . , α q (x q ). Note that the attribute functions f i share the same vector of formal parameters y, which we call attribute vector 1 , modulo renaming, and, therefore, have the same arity, which is by no means restrictive in terms of language expressiveness. Each v i for i ∈ {0, . . . , n} is an expression of the same type as f 's return type built over the variables y ∪ x i . In real eb 3 specifications with distinct formal parameters y i each corresponding to every f i , y can be formalized as the union of the y i , i ∈ 1..n. We also assume that the attribute functions are ordered, so that for all h ∈ 1..n, i ∈ 1..n, j ∈ 1..q, every function call of the form "f h (T, . . .)" occurring in w j i satisfies h < i and every call of the form "f h (front (T), . . .)" satisfies h ≥ 0. Such an ordering can be constructed if the eb 3 specification does not contain circular dependencies between function calls, which would potentially lead to infinite attribute function evaluation. In particular, the definition of an attribute function f i cannot contain recursive calls of the form "f i (T, . . .)", but only recursive calls of the form "f i (front (T), . . .)". Note that this does not limit the expressiveness of eb 3 attribute functions, because every recursive computation on data expressions only (which keeps the trace unchanged) can be described using standard functions and not attribute functions. The eb 3 specification of Fig. 1 satisfies this ordering, as the definition of borrower contains calls of the form "borrower (front (T), bId)", while the definition of nbLoans contains calls of the form "nbLoans (front (T), mId)" and "borrower (T, bId)".
Process expressions
Expressions are built over variables, constants, and standard operations. An action ρ is the simplest process expression, whose semantics are given by Rule M 1 . The symbol √ (which is not part of the user syntax) denotes successful execution. The trace T of an eb 3 specification at a given moment consists of the sequence of visible actions executed since the start of the system. (Note therefore that λ does not appear in the trace.) At system start, the trace is empty. If T denotes the current trace and action ρ can be executed, then T.ρ denotes the trace just after executing ρ. eb 3 processes can be combined with classical process algebra operators such as the sequence "E 1 .E 2 " (M 2 , M 3 ), the choice "E 1 | E 2 " (M 4 ) and the Kleene closure "E 0 * " (M 5 , M 6 ). Rules (M 7 to M 9 ) define parallel composition "E 1 |[ ]| E 2 " of E 1 , E 2 with synchronization on ⊆ Lab. The condition "in (ρ, )" is true iff the label of ρ belongs to . The symmetric Rules for choice and parallel composition have been omitted for brevity. Expressions "E 1 ||| E 2 " and "E 1 || E 2 " are equivalent respectively to "E 1 |[∅]| E 2 " and "
Quantification is permitted for choice and parallel composition. If V is a set of expressions {v 1 , . . . , v n }, "|x : V : E 0 " and "|[ ]|x : V : E 0 " stand respectively for "E 0 [x :
, where "E [x : v ]" denotes the replacement of all occurrences of x by v in E . For instance, "||x : {1, 2, 3} : a (x )" stands for "a (1) || a (2) || a (3)".
At last, named processes can be instantiated as usual (M 11 ). Given an eb 3 process expression E , we write vars (E ) for the set of variables occurring free in E .
Verification requirements
We need to verify that the eb 3 specification of Fig. 1 satisfies the functional requirements of the simplified library management system presented in Sect. 2. To this end, we divide them into liveness and safety properties. Liveness properties express the possibility that a certain event will take place and safety properties express the certitude that a certain event will never take place. Requirements R1 and R3 are typical liveness properties and requirements R2 and R4 are typical safety properties.
Related works
Following the technique of [GFL05, GFL06] , one may devise a translation from the eb 3 specification of Fig. 1 to the B method. This approach suffices to verify requirements R2 and R4, since safety properties can be formalized in the B method, but the verification of requirements R1 and R3 cannot be addressed by way of classical refinement techniques. An important class of liveness properties can be verified in Event-B [Abr10] as explained in [HA11, Gro06] . In [HA11] , the system is defined as an Event-B model and the liveness property φ in question is expressed in Linear Tree Logic (LTL) [Pnu77] . Then, the Büchi automaton corresponding to φ is translated to an equivalent Event-B model that is added to the initial Event-B model. Finally, the consistency of the final model implies the satisfaction of φ. In [Gro06] , the liveness property φ is expressed as proof obligations of the Event-B model, whose resolution implies the satisfaction of φ. More recent work [STW + 14] in the field sets a framework for preserving liveness and fairness properties in LTL along successive refinement steps of Event-B machines. The refinement of events is allowed among the possible refinement steps of this scheme.
However, the use of LTL is usually inadequate for the verification of liveness properties over ISs. The reason lies in the presence of loops in the IS specification leading to infinite paths. To see this, let's consider a certain class of liveness properties called reachability properties. Reachability properties can be expressed in Computational Tree Logic (CTL) [CES86] formulas "AG(ψ ⇒ EF φ)" that are satisfied if for all states that are reachable from the initial states of the system, where formula ψ is valid, there is a sequence of transitions that lead to states of the system, where formula φ is valid. Reachability properties cannot be expressed and verified in LTL. Instead, only branching-time logics like CTL can be used for this purpose. Hence, the verification techniques of [HA11, Gro06, STW + 14] are not applicable here. In [ETL + 04] , the authors propose the translation of eb 3 specifications to equivalent CSP B [ST05, TSB03] specifications. CSP B is an hybrid method that combines features of CSP and the B method. The dynamic behaviour of the IS in question is directly cast to a CSP specification. CSP shares common process algebraic features with eb 3 . The system state inherent to the attribute function definitions has to be defined explicitly via the state variables of a B specification. Then, every CSP action execution triggers a unique operation of the B specification that has an immediate effect on the state variables. The properties over the CSP B specification have to be expressed in CSP and the verification is carried out by the FDR2 model checker [Fdr97] . Liveness properties expressed as temporal properties can be cast to FDR2 as explained in [LMC00] . As a result, both liveness and safety properties of the library specification can be verified with the aid of refinement checking and the FDR2 model checker. Although the method of [ETL + 04] is systematic, the translation of eb 3 specifications to equivalent CSP B models is not automatic, but still necessitates user intervention.
On the other hand, it is known that temporal logic can deal both with safety and liveness properties. Hence, another approach concerned with the verification of temporal logic properties of eb 3 specifications by means of model checking techniques is taken. For this purpose, the formal description and verification of the library management system specification [Ger06] using six verification tools are undertaken in [FFC10, Cho10] are called explicit model checkers. In CADP and FDR2, the transition system describing the system specification is constructed explicitly prior to the property verification, whereas in the case of SPIN, the property is verified while the transition system is constructed in parallel (on-the-fly verification). Nu-SMV belongs to a group of model-checkers called symbolic model checkers. In symbolic model checking language specifications, the transition system is given in the form of Boolean formula. ALLOY is a language based on first-order logic. Moreover, ALLOY models are defined purely as sets and relations on these sets. Properties are expressed as boolean expressions and verification is reduced to the SAT problem. It is worth mentioning that ALLOY's language used to model the system is the same as the language used to specify the property we need to verify. The same applies to PROB, whereas Spin, CADP, NuSMV use either action-based or state-based temporal logics. In the case of ALLOY and the case of reachability properties, the authors of [FFC10] specified (manually) ad hoc traces leading to the states of the system model satisfying these properties, which is the reason why ALLOY was proven to be the most efficient among the six verification tools used in the paper. The drawback of this approach is that it necessitates good knowledge of the underlying transition system by the user. As a whole, the study in [FFC10] revealed the necessity of branching-time logics for accurately characterizing properties of ISs, and the fact that process algebraic languages are suitable for describing the behaviour and synchronization of IS entities. However, no attempt of providing a systematic translation from eb 3 to a target language accepted as input by a model checker is made so far.
In [MF15] , the verification of reachability properties "AG(ψ ⇒ EF φ)" with the aid of the B method is undertaken. The goal of this study is to construct a program p that refines a reachability property q in the sense that the set of execution paths related to program p is strictly a subset of the execution paths related to the satisfaction of reachability formula q. The construction of p follows the algorithmic refinement laws of Morgan [Mor98] that are intended to decompose q into a sequence of properties, which can be trivially refined by simple system transitions (actions). This method is not automatic, as the user is asked to specify the program that refines the given specification.
In this article, we address the problem of automatic translation (no user intervention) of eb 3 models to equivalent LNT models knowing that:
• LNT is one of the input languages accepted by the CADP verification toolbox featuring full-blown temporal property validation capabilities, and that • the model checking on LNT models allows branching-time reasoning, hence allowing the verification of liveness properties on IS specifications.
Memory Semantics
We define the memory semantics 
is given as follows:
where the notation . denotes the evaluation of data expressions based on the classic interpretations for Peano Arithmetic, Set Theory and Boolean Logic under the current memory M (implicit both in Fig. 3 The guarded expression process "C ⇒ E 0 " (M 10 ) can execute E 0 if the Boolean condition C holds under memory M, which is denoted by the side condition "
Since C may contain calls to attribute functions of the form f (T, v ), the evaluation of C necessitates their replacement by their corresponding attribute variables f [ v ] . The trace T is discharged from C and, hence, the evaluation of the guard C does not depend on T. Note that the evaluation of C and the execution of the first action ρ in E 0 are simultaneous, i.e., no action is allowed in concurrent processes in the meantime. We call this property the guard-action atomicity. This property is essential for consistency as, by side effects, the occurrence of actions in concurrent processes could implicitly change the value of C before the guarded action has been executed.
Execution
We demonstrate how the memory semantics Sem M works for the simplified library management system, whose specification (processes and attribute functions) in eb 3 is given in Fig. 1 . As an example, we set m p NbLoans 2, i.e. we consider two books b 1 and b 2 , and two members m 1 and m 2 . The memory has four cells:
The first two cells keep the two values of the attribute function borrower (T, •) for a given trace T, and the last two keep the values of nbLoans (T, •). After every step, the new value of each cell can be calculated from the previous memory and the action that has just been executed. The memory is initially set to (⊥, ⊥, ⊥, ⊥). 
where T corresponds to the system trace at state (C), i.e. T T C . Condition (4) illustrates the conditions under which member m 1 can lend book b 1 (notably if the book is available and the number of loans carried out by m 1 is inferior to two). We concentrate on the evaluation of the attribute function call "borrower (T, b 1 )" w.r.t. Sem M and then we compare it with the evaluation of "borrower (T, b 1 )" w.r.t. the classical traced-based memory Sem T . 
from which follows directly that Sem M is computationally more efficient than Sem T . 
The Language LNT
LNT aims at providing the best features of imperative and functional programming languages and value-passing process algebras. It has a user friendly syntax and formal operational semantics defined in terms of labeled transition systems (LTSs). LNT is supported by the LNT.OPEN tool of CADP, which allows the on-the-fly exploration of the LTS corresponding to a LNT specification. We present the fragment of LNT that serves as the target of our translation. LNT terms B also called as behaviours are built from actions, choice (select), conditional (if), sequential composition (;), breakable loop (loop and break) and parallel composition (par). Communication is carried out by rendezvous on gates, written G, G 1 , . . . , G m , and may be guarded using Boolean conditions on the received values (where clause). LNT allows multiway rendezvous with bidirectional (send/receive) value exchange on the same gate occurrence, each offer O being either a send offer (!) or a receive offer (?), independently of the other offers. Expressions E are built from variables, type constructors, function applications and constants. Labels L identify loops, which can be escaped using "break L" from inside the loop body. Processes are parameterized by gates and data variables. LNT syntax and semantics are formally defined in SOS style in [CCG05] .
MCL
MCL is an extension of the alternation-free modal μ-calculus [EL + 86] with action predicates enabling value extraction, modalities containing extended regular expressions on transition sequences, quantified variables and parameterized fixed point operators, programming language constructs, and fairness operators encoding generalized Büchi automata. These features make possible a concise and intuitive description of safety, liveness, and fairness properties involving data, without sacrificing the efficiency of on-the-fly model checking, which has a linear-time complexity for the dataless MCL formulas [MT08] .
In particular, MCL consists of data expressions e, action formulas α and state formulas φ. Let a set of data variables X and a set of function identifiers F with standard interpretation. Data expressions e are defined as follows:
where x ∈ X and f ∈ F denoting typed function identifiers.
Action formulas α consist of:
• action patterns of the form {c !e 1 . .
. . , n}, and • usual Boolean operators.
To sum up, the abstract syntax of action formulas α is given by the following grammar: We assign values to propositional variables x ∈ X appearing in expressions e and action formulas α that are denoted as δ : X → T 1 ∪ · · · ∪ T n . Moreover, we assign functions to all free propositional variables Y appearing in MCL state formulas that are denoted as ρ : Y → F. Notations "μ Y .φ" and "νY .φ" denote the corresponding fixed points of monotonic functions over Y → 2 S . Other useful operators like if and case can also be used to construct MCL formulas. Their definition is found in [MT08] .
Action patterns are enriched with additional features such as the wilcard clause any that matches any value and the "where V " clause denoting that the pattern-matching takes place on condition that condition V evaluates to true. Remark that parameters ?x : T can appear syntactically in V .
The abstract syntax of MCL state formulas is given by the following grammar:
The necessity modality is the dual of possibility modality "[ α ] φ ¬ α ¬φ". The maximal fixed point operator is the dual of the minimal fixed point operator: 
The expression inside [ . ] describes the set of execution paths starting with a bounded number of actions (denoted as true * ) followed by a RESERVE action of book B by member M , a bounded number of actions that are not TAKE actions of B by M and a RESERVE action of book B by member M . Finally, false notation is used to denote that the paths described inside [ . ] are not possible (safety property).
Translation of EB
3 to LNT
Translation of attribute functions
Ordering attribute functions as described in Sect. 6 allows the memory to be updated consistently, from f 1 to f n in turn. At every instant, already-updated values correspond to calls of the form f h (T, . . .) (the value of f h on the current trace), whereas calls of the form f h (front (T), . . .) are replaced by accesses to a copy g of the memory f , which was made before starting the update. This encoding thus enables the trace parameter to be discharged from function calls, ensuring that while updating f i , accesses to f h with h < i necessarily correspond to calls with parameter T. The process M is defined in Fig. 7 . It runs an infinite loop, which "listens" to all possible actions α j of the system. At this point, we recall the existence of unique attribute function definition f i (T : T , y 1 : T 1 , . . . , y s : T s ) : T (see Fig. 2 for details). Each attribute variable f i is an array with s dimensions, where s is the common arity for attribute functions f i minus 1, because the trace parameter is now discharged. Each dimension of array f i , thus, corresponds to one formal parameter in y i , so that: Note also that enum depends on function mod (E ) which transforms an expression E by syntactically replacing function calls by array accesses as described previously. Namely according to the definition of mod (w type MID is m 1 , m 2 , m ⊥ with "eq", "ne", "ord", "val" end type type BID is b 1 , b ⊥ with "eq", "ne", "ord", "val" end type Identifier eq (ne) denotes the equality (inequality) operator among member IDs or book IDs. The bottom value for member IDs is denoted as m ⊥ and the bottom value for book IDs is denoted as b ⊥ . In the following, the type referring to the number of books possessed by each member of the library is denoted as an array NB and the type referring to the current borrower of each book is denoted as an array BOR. Hence Fig. 7 , we need an auxilliary variable bId to go through all possible values of book IDs, i.e. the elements that inhabit BID's domain, in order to simulate the modification of borrower [bId] in case that book bId is lent to member mId. In each iteration of the loop construct, it is checked if bId is equal to the current value of bId , in which case borrower [bId] is set to the current borrower, i.e. mId. Then, it is checked if bId is equal to the last element of BID's domain, i.e. b 1 , in which case the program control breaks from the loop construct. Otherwise, bId is assigned the next element in the ordered set of BID's domain, i.e. "bId : val (ord (bId ) + 1)", and the execution of the loop construct is repeated.
Similarly, we need an auxiliary variable mId to go through all possible values of member IDs, i.e. the elements that inhabit MID's domain, in order to simulate the modification of nbLoans [bId] in case that book bId is lent to member mId. In each iteration of the loop construct, it is checked if mId coincides with the current value of mId , in which case nbLoans[mId] is increased by one. Then, it is checked if mId is equal to the last element of MID's domain, i.e. m 2 , in which case the program control breaks from the loop construct. Otherwise, mId is assigned the next element in the ordered set of MID's domain, i.e. "mId : val (ord (mId ) + 1)", and the execution of the loop construct is repeated. 
Optimizations
Notice that the inert action λ has been removed from the previous LNT specification, since λ is does not appear in the program script and, as a result, it is supposed not to affect the control flow.
Similarly, attribute variable vector f (nbLoans, borrower ) is removed from the parameter vector of communication labels that synchronize with expressions of the form "α (v , ?f ) where mod (C )" present in other LNT processes (see Fig. 9 ), for which the corresponding guard mod (C ) makes no use of attribute variable vector f . In particular, this optimization applies to communication labels Acquire, Register, Unregister and Return. The static analysis of LNT specifications cater for an efficient discovery of all guards, as well as their related communication labels.
The only coordinates of attribute variable vector f (nbLoans, borrower ) passed as parameters to the communication labels "α (v , ?f ) where mod (C )" are exactly those appearing in mod (C ). Notice, for example, that vector nbLoans is not a subset of the parameter vector passed to communication label Discard, since the static analysis of the LNT specification reveals that no corresponding guard to Discard makes use of nbLoans.
The code referring to attribute variables that remain unchanged during a communication is omitted. This is the case for communication labels Acquire, Discard, Register and Unregister in the previous LNT code.
It turns out that the code simulating the effect of eb 3 action "Lend ( 
Translation of processes
We define a translation function t from an eb 3 process expression to an LNT process. Most eb 3 constructs are process algebra constructs with a direct correspondence in LNT. The main difficulty arises in the translation of guarded process expressions of the form "C ⇒ E 0 " in a way that guarantees the guard-action atomicity. This led us to consider a second parameter for the translation function t, namely the condition C , whose evaluation is delayed until the first action occurring in the process expression E 0 . The definition of t (E , C ) is given in Fig. 9 . An eb 3 specification E 0 will then be translated into:
and every process definition of the form "P (x ) E " will be translated into the process:
where {α 1 , . . . , α q } Lab. The rules of Fig. 9 can be commented as follows:
• Rule (1) translates the λ action. Note that λ cannot be translated to the empty LNT statement null, because execution of λ may depend on a guard C , whose evaluation requires the memory to be read, so as to get attribute variable values. This is done by the LNT communication action λ (?f ). The guard C is evaluated after replacing calls to attribute functions (all of which have the form f i (T, v i )) by the appropriate attribute variables, using function mod defined in Fig. 7 . Rule (2) is similar but handles visible actions.
• Rule (3) translates eb 3 sequential composition into LNT sequential composition, passing the evaluation of C to the first process expression.
• Rule (4) makes a conjunction between the guard of the current process expression with the guard already accumulated from the context.
• Rules (5) and (6) translate the choice and quantified choice operators of eb 3 into their direct LNT counterpart.
• Rule (7) translates the Kleene closure into a combination of LNT loop and select, following the identity
• Rule (8) translates eb 3 parallel composition into LNT parallel composition.
• Rule (9) translates eb 3 quantified parallel composition into LNT parallel composition by expanding the type V of the quantification variable, since LNT does not have a quantified parallel composition operator.
• Rule (10) translates an eb 3 process call into the corresponding LNT process call, which requires gates to be passed as parameters.
• Rules (7) to (10) only apply when the guard C is trivially true. In the other cases, we must apply Rule (11), which generates code implementing the guard. If C does not use attribute functions, i.e., does not depend on the trace, then it can be evaluated immediately without communicating with the memory process (first case). Otherwise, the guard evaluation must be delayed until the first action of the process expression E 0 . When E 0 is either a Kleene closure, a parallel composition, or a process call, identifying its first action syntactically is not obvious. One solution would consist in expanding E 0 into a choice in which every branch has a fixed initial action 3 , to which the guard would be added. We preferred an alternative solution that avoids the potential combinatorial explosion of code due to static expansion. A process pr C (defined in Fig. 10 ) is placed in parallel to t (E 0 , true) and both processes synchronize on all actions. Process pr C imposes on t (E 0 , true) the constraint that the first executed action must satisfy the condition C (then branch). For subsequent actions, the condition is relaxed (else branch). Note that the equivalent LNT process of eb 3 process main is placed in parallel to memory process M . Moreover, the simulation of eb 3 quantified parallel synchronization operator (that has no equivalent operator in LNT) is applied to eb 3 expressions "|||bId : BID : book (bId) * " and "|||mId : MID : member (mId) * " and the eb 3 Kleene Closure operator is simulated as described in Fig. 9 . The body of LNT processes book and member is defined as below: The following example illustrates and justifies the use of process pr C as a means to solve the guard-action atomicity problem. Consider the eb 3 system:
where C denotes the Boolean condition:
and Lab {Lend, Return}. The LNT code corresponding to this system is the following:
The first action executed by this system may be either Lend or Return. We consider the case where Lend is executed first. According to the LNT semantics, it results from the multiway synchronization of the following three actions: Thus, in pr C at synchronization time, f is an up-to-date copy of the memory stored in M , b b 1 , and m m 1 . The only condition for the synchronization to occur is the guard mod (C ), whose value is computed using the up-to-date copy f of the memory. In case mod (C ) evaluates to true, no other action (susceptible to modifying f ) can occur between the evaluation of mod (C ) and the occurrence of Lend as both happen synchronously, thus achieving the guard-action atomicity. Once Lend has occurred, Return can occur without any condition, as the value of start has now become false.
We developed an automatic translator tool from eb 3 specifications to LNT, named eb 3 2lnt, implemented using the Ocaml Lex/Yacc compiler construction technology. It consists of about 900 lines of OCaml code. We applied eb 3 2lnt on a benchmark of eb 3 specifications, which includes variations of the library management system.
We noticed that, for each eb 3 specification, the code size of the equivalent LNT specification is twice as big.
Part of this expansion is caused by the fact that LNT is more structured than eb 3 : LNT requires more keywords and gates have to be declared and passed as parameters to each process call. By looking at the Rules of Fig. 9 , we can see that the other causes of expansion are Rule (5), which duplicates the condition C , and Rule (9), which duplicates the body E 0 of the quantified parallel composition operator "|[ ]|x : V : E 0 " as many times as there are elements in the set V . Both expansions are linear in the size of the source eb 3 code. However, in the case of a nested parallel composition "|[ 1 ]|x 1 : V 1 : . . . |[ n ]|x n : V n : E 0 ", the expansion factor is as high as the product of the number of elements in the respective sets V 1 , . . . , V n , which may be large. If E 0 is a big process expression, the expansion can be limited by encapsulating E 0 in a parameterized process "P E 0 (x 1 , . . . , x n )" and replacing duplicated occurrences of E 0 by appropriate instances of P E 0 .
Case Study Revisited
We illustrate below the application of the eb 3 2lnt translator in conjunction with CADP for analyzing an extended version of the IS library management system, whose description in eb 3 can be found in Annex C of [Ger06] . With respect to the simplified version presented in Sect. 3, the IS enables e.g., members to renew their loans and to reserve books, and their reservations to be cancelled or transferred to other members on demand. The desired behaviour of this IS was characterized in [FFC10] as a set of 15 requirements expressed informally as follows: R1. A book can always be acquired by the library when it is not currently acquired. R2. A book cannot be acquired by the library if it is already acquired.
R3. An acquired book can be discarded only if it is neither borrowed nor reserved. R4. A person must be a member of the library in order to borrow a book. R5. A book can be reserved only if it has been borrowed or already reserved by some member. R6. A book cannot be reserved by the member who is borrowing it. R7. A book cannot be reserved by a member who is reserving it. R8. A book cannot be lent to a member if it is reserved. R9. A member cannot renew a loan or give the book to another member if the book is reserved. R10. A member is allowed to take a reserved book only if he owns the oldest reservation. R11. A book can be taken only if it is not borrowed. R12. A member who has reserved a book can cancel the reservation at anytime before he takes it. R13. A member can relinquish library membership only when all his loans have been returned and all his reservations have either been used or cancelled. R14. Ultimately, there is always a procedure that enables a member to leave the library. R15. A member cannot borrow more than the loan limit defined at the system level for all users.
We expressed all the above requirements using the property specification language MCL [MT08] . We show below the MCL formulation of two requirements from the list above, which denote typical safety and liveness properties. Requirement R2 is expressed in MCL as follows:
This formula uses the standard safety pattern "[β] false", which forbids the existence of transition sequences matching the regular formula β. Here the undesirable sequences are those containing two Acquire operations for the same book B without a Discard operation for B in the meantime. The regular formula true * matches a subsequence of (zero or more) transitions labeled by arbitrary actions. Note the use of the construct "?B : string", which matches any string and extracts its value in the variable B used later in the formula. Therefore, the above formula captures all occurrences of books carried by Acquire operations in the model. Requirement R12 is formulated in MCL as follows:
This formula denotes a liveness property of the form "[β 1 ] β 2 true", which states that every transition sequence matching the regular formula β 1 (in this case, book B has been reserved by member M and subsequently neither taken nor transferred) ends in a state from which there exists a transition sequence matching the regular formula β 2 (in this case, the reservation can be cancelled before being taken or transferred). Requirement R7 can be formulated as follows:
All requirements formulated in MCL can be found in Appendix C. Using eb 3 2lnt, we translated the eb 3 specification of the library management system to LNT. The resulting specification was checked against all the 15 requirements, formulated in MCL, using the EVALUATOR 4.0 model checker of CADP. The experiments were performed on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 CPU 880 at 3.07 GHz. Table 1 shows the results for several configurations of the IS, obtained by instantiating the number of books (m) and members (p) in the IS. All requirements were shown to be valid on the IS specification. The second and third line of the table indicate the number of states and transitions of the LTS corresponding to the LNT specification. The fourth line gives the time needed to generate the LTS and the other lines give the verification time for each requirement.
Note that the number of states generated increases with the size of m and p as EVALUATOR 4.0 applies explicit techniques for state space generation. According to Table 1, verifying the library management system becomes intractable for more than four members and four books. This misbehaviour is mainly attributed to the presence of parallel compositions between members and books as well as the loose synchronisation between these components leading to exponential growth of the state space.
Comparison with [FFC10]
We recall that CADP was used in [FFC10] for the verification of a version of the library management system with similar functionalities. According to the same paper, the time needed to generate the corresponding LTS for NbLoans 1, was 970.2 s approximately, the average time needed to verify the system requirements was 74.63 s and no information is provided for the size of the LTS, which means that no reliable comparison of the two works is possible. Note also that the LNT specification, to whom the results of Table 1 are related, was automatically generated by eb 3 2lnt, whereas the results of [FFC10] correspond to a manual LNT specification of the library management system.
Regarding the other verification tools employed in [FFC10] , only verification with ALLOY outperforms our verification scheme with CADP, which is normal as in [FFC10] in the case of reachability properties for example the traces needed to satisfy them are specified by the user, which implies that automatic verification with ALLOY as done in [FFC10] is not automatic and therefore not adequate.
Conclusion
We proposed an approach for equipping the eb 3 method with formal verification capabilities by reusing already available model checking technology. Our approach relies upon a new translation from eb 3 to LNT, which provides a direct connection to all the state-of-the-art verification features of the CADP toolbox. The translation, based on alternative memory semantics of eb 3 [VD13] instead of the original trace semantics [FSt03] , was automated by the eb 3 2lnt translator and validated on several examples of typical ISs. So far, we experimented only the model checking of MCL data-based temporal properties on eb 3 specifications. However, CADP also provides extensive support for equivalence checking and compositional LTS construction, which can be of interest to IS designers.
We also provided a formal proof of the translation from eb 3 to LNT that can be found in [Vek14] , which could serve as reference for translating eb 3 to other process algebras as well. eb 3 2lnt offers insight to interested readers on:
• how to code global state as a process running parallel to the principal system specification, and • how to solve the atomicity problem (imposing the simultaneous evaluation of C with the execution of the first action of E in expressions of the form C ⇒ E ) by a way of another process running to the principal system specification.
On the other hand, the main limitation of the proposed translation is that model-checking becomes intractable for specifications describing multiple concurrent processes as is the case for the library specification for more than four members and four books. This inconvenience is attributed mainly to:
• the frequent use of parallel composition operators in eb 3 specifications that lead to the exponential growth of execution traces, and • the fact that CADP employs explicit techniques instead of symbolic techniques for state space generation.
Another drawback of the proposed translation arises at the stage of property verification. Properties should be expressed in MCL, which implies that eb 3 users should be familiar with MCL's syntax. However, one should note that the whole scale of MCL formulas can be used for the verification of eb 3 specifications, despite the fact that the emphasis of this paper is given on safety and liveness properties.
As future work, we plan to study abstraction techniques for verifying properties regardless of the number of entity instances that participate in the IS, following the approaches for parameterized model checking [ABJ + 99] . This study will establish the fact that verifying systems with many components (members and books in our case) is equivalent to verifying systems with the same structure as before, but less components. In particular, we will observe how the insertion of new functionalities into an IS affects this issue, and we will formalize this in the context of eb 3 specifications.
A. LNT code for the Simplified Library Management System
We give the optimized LNT code for the simplified Library Management System, with 2 members, 1 book, and NbLoans set to 1.
module library is type mId is m 1 , m 2 , m ⊥ with "eq", "ne", "ord", "val" end type type BID is b 1 , b ⊥ with "eq", "ne", "ord", " end macro R 1 ("B1") and R 1 ("B2") and R 1 ("B3") This is a classical liveness property. The second conjunct of "R 1 (B )" expresses the eventuality that a book be withdrawn from the library before it is reacquired. The first conjunct or "R 4 (M )" expresses the fact that a member cannot borrow a book if (s)he has not registered to the library. The second conjunct expresses that if a member relinquishes his/her membership, (s)he may not lend a book neither via the regular loan action LEND nor the reservation action RESERVE. 
